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In recent years the notion and phenomenon of ‘failing’ states - states
deemed incapable to fulfil the basic tasks of providing security for their
populace -, has been rapidly drawing attention. The incidence has been on
the increase especially among countries of the South, and particularly,
though not exclusively, in Africa. Among the explanations offered, fragility
of state structures, lack of capacity and ‘bad’ governance have been recur-
rent ingredients put forward, though each of these inevitably begs further
queries: why are they fragile to begin with, why is there this lack of capac-
ity, and so forth. The phenomenon continues to prompt searches for expla-
nation as well as contemplation of international policy responses. 
Not a few of such explanatory explorations have tended to look for ‘inher-
ent’, ‘intrinsic’ or other internal factors that might be held accountable for
the weaknesses concerned. To be sure, the state systems concerned, or
what remains of them, are generally not ‘robust’. However, if we further
probe into how they came to be this way, and what models for state build-
ing and developmental perspectives have been held out to them over the
years, then this may require us to extend the perspective and ask whether
it is just fragile and failing states we are looking at, or whether we also have
to do with failing models? It seems useful to pose this question explicitly
for further reflection, and to explore the links between failing models for
state building and the realities of state failure that we may observe. 
In taking this up, my point of departure will be to accept that connection
and to approach the question in terms of a connection between fragile/fail-
ing states and of failing models. I will start off with a closer look at the inci-
dence of fragile states and state failure, more specifically of state collapse.
Connected with this, I will raise the question of differential degrees of
propensity to failure and collapse among contemporary state systems, and
to point to apparent regional variations in this regard. 
Against this background, it will be useful to first switch back a moment and
recall how in a sense the Cold War had the effect of stabilizing various post-
colonial state systems in the South and re-affirming the nation-building
model on the basis of which they had started out on their trajectories of
independent statehood. Thereafter, in the years following the Cold War, the
global environment changed abruptly and drastically: there were successive
waves of external inroads into the state systems of the South which rep-
resented ever so many novel models for state building, though in the end
leaving many of them weakened rather than strengthened to fulfil their
basic functions. The hitherto prevalent idea of ‘the relative autonomy’ of
the state suffered a severe setback in reality as well as in theorizing on the
state (Doornbos 2001). 
2As state fragility became more pervasive, the incidence of state collapse
also became less exceptional. Yet, to better understand and respond to sit-
uations of state collapse, I shall argue, it will be important to differentiate
between different trajectories put into motion after the lifting of hegemon-
ic frameworks. In response to this, rather than trying to develop general
blueprints for intervention, external actors would do better by de-generaliz-
ing about causes and possible remedies to state collapse. This will be
essential in the search for meaningful fresh starts, which as a matter of prin-
ciple should allow a central rather than a spectators’ role to domestic polit-
ical actors and give them a chance to regain a basic autonomy of action.    
Incidence of state collapse
State collapse should refer to situations that occur when ‘the basic func-
tions of the state are no longer performed’ (Zartman 1995: 5), that is, when
they have ground to a halt due to severe internal conflicts, lack of proper
management of resources, or other causes. Such situations tend to repre-
sent the most far-going or extreme form and ‘proof’ of state fragility, frag-
mentation and disintegration. In the light of  its growing incidence in the
1990s and the early years of the new millennium, a newly emerging theme
in international policy  analysis became that of addressing “the challenge of
rebuilding war-torn societies” (Bastian and Luckham 2003, Journal of Peace
Research 2002, Milliken 2003). The challenge refers to the increasing num-
ber of countries, in Europe as well as in Africa, Asia and Latin America,
where the very fabric of society and institutional structures became torn
apart as a result of civil war and prolonged violent conflict, or in some cases
due to external interventions. In several of these situations, the continued
existence of countries as distinct political entities, let alone as ‘national’
states, appeared to have become precarious, uncertain, or outright impos-
sible. Recent examples include Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Congo, Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia and El Salvador. But the category might
at some point also come to embrace countries like Sudan, Burundi, Ivory
Coast, Haiti, Tadzjikistan, and others within the foreseeable future, as the
dimension of fragility is probably much wider than can be witnessed from
the instances of states that have actually fragmented or collapsed.
Increasingly, international agencies, somehow representing a new type of
‘staying’ element in a rapidly changing global context, find themselves
called upon to restore law and order and to initiate peace-building process-
es in such internal conflict situations (Moore 1996). 
In recent years, several dozen such active UN operations have been start-
ed across the globe, a number which may be expected to further increase
in the years to come. The post ‘9/11’ era offers a rapidly changing context
for the emergence and handling of these dynamics, including the possibili-
3ty of unpredictable as well as unprecedented superpower interventions, or
their absence precisely where they might have been called for. Recurrent
external admonitions propagating ‘good governance’, decentralization and
state restructuring in other respects, added a further layer of complexity to
the relations at stake.  Uncertain futures, marked by queries about the
premises, direction and viability of state forms or alternative political for-
mula, came to present increasingly familiar yet agonizing questions with
respect to the global political landscape.
Clearly, one thing we thus need is to better understand trajectories of state
decline: current rethinking on the past and future of states demands that
we raise questions such as why do states collapse, why do some states
seem to collapse more readily than others, and why and how are some
states subject to pervasive degeneration while others retain greater
resilience and integration? Among other things, this will call for distinctions
between different types of and trajectories to collapse. And there is also the
basic and intriguing question as to what lies ‘beyond collapse’. In broad his-
torical perspective,  it has been argued, ‘[c]ollapse, far from being an anom-
aly, both in the real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in dra-
matic form not the end of social institutions, but almost always the begin-
ning of new ones’ (Eisenstadt 1988: 293). With respect to the contempo-
rary drama, in similar vein, Ali Mazrui raised the intriguing question: ‘Have
Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, Burundi been experiencing the death
pangs of an old order dying and groaning for refuge? Or are we witnessing
the birth pangs of a real but devastating birth of a genuinely post-colonial
order?’ (Mazrui 1955: 22). Before any such fundamental resurrection may
take place, however, the state systems concerned may well find them-
selves in a state of limbo or prolonged statelessness, like in recent years in
Somalia. 
Opposite though they are in terms of their direction, dynamics of state for-
mation and state failure culminating in state collapse appear to belong to
the same field of analysis, conceptually speaking. State formation, which
almost invariably is a long-term process, may be said to be taking place
wherever a state system establishes, extends or enhances its capacity to
overcome challenges to its territorial and institutional integrity and succeeds
in playing a pivotal coordinating role in initiating integrative economic and
social policies. State failure may manifest itself through incapacity of the
state to prevent or curb pervasive violence and insecurity, mitigate ethnic
or religious conflicts, or to contain arbitrary and oppressive action by its
army or other state agencies. State collapse constitutes the ultimate phase
in any such spiral of deteriorating political dynamics, characterized by the
wholesale disintegration and falling apart of a state’s institutional fabric.
The notion of ‘cascading fragilities’, with its implied focus on processes of
collapse, can serve heuristic purposes in this connection. 
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Propensity to state collapse
But questions about the future of the state or state systems do not merely
concern the changing nature of their ‘core’ business and related structur-
ing. By implication they also relate to their relative capacity to ‘adjust’ and
maintain themselves in an increasingly capricious global environment, or, in
other words, to their propensity to survive rather than collapse. That, it
could be argued, is also part of their core business. Ever since ‘structural
adjustment’ was adopted as a strategy of intervention by the major global
financial institutions, massive evidence has been accumulating to attest to
the impacts in terms of the increasing social and economic vulnerabilities of
numerous groups and individuals in countries of the South, and the weak-
ening capacity of state systems to provide them with basic social security.
In not a few instances, growing livelihood insecurities have led to wide-
spread destitution, intensified rural-urban and trans-national migration and
social conflicts, increasing the chances of political failure to cope with these
deteriorating conditions, and in the end with a question as to whether state
institutions will be able to survive. Nonetheless, the impacts of global forces
have been differential. Not all countries of the South have been equally vul-
nerable to state crisis and potential collapse. Some, particularly those that
have been heavily dependent on agricultural production but were fetching
lower and lower prices on the world market, have been hit especially
severely. Others, which had the mixed blessing of being mineral-rich, or
becoming the producers of profitable drugs, have also proven particularly
vulnerable as governable state frameworks. Yet others, particularly those
that managed to make their industrial entry into the global market, have
instead proven remarkably resilient. 
Regional variations
At the risk of over-generalization, there appear to be important regional
dimensions to these patterns, with more instances of state systems in
Africa having fallen victim to state failure and collapse than has been the
case in Asia. Africa in recent years has gone on record with the cases of
Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and basically Congo, while there have been
other ‘near-collapse’ cases on an almost continuous basis. Earlier Chad,
Angola, Mozambique, Uganda and Rwanda would similarly have ranked as
failing, failed or collapsed states. Still, an equation of African states with
state collapse needs to be qualified. In Asia and the Pacific, the cases of
Afghanistan, Cambodia and earlier Lebanon, as well as ‘potentials’ like
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, suggest that though Africa
has a stronger record of problem cases, it has no monopoly on state failure





aAt any rate, asking whether there has been a stronger propensity for state
collapse in Africa than in Asia or elsewhere may be a more relevant enquiry
than just trying to count the respective numbers of state failure and collapse
at either end. If one were to do this, and ask why that could be the case,
then such features like the relative extent of institutional cohesion, con-
centration of administrative power and especially the capacity for social
mobilization within and through the state framework, may need to be rec-
ognized as of special significance. Beyond the crucial question as to how
countries have come to be inserted in the world market, it is in the end
these kinds of factors which appear to make a difference with respect to
the extent to which societies and states have remained either relatively
insulated from or become vulnerable to the risks of fragmentation and col-
lapse. ‘Propensity to collapse’, in other words, could possibly be conceived
as an alternative yardstick for assessing the nature and relative robustness
of the state in its relations with the society and global environment. 
But a fuller scrutiny of the ‘propensity’ question may also require us to look
back into the respective historical records, including the differential ways in
which Western imperialism has impacted on Asia, Africa and Latin America.
By and large, Asian states, even if undergoing major structural transforma-
tions during colonialism, like in India, have known stronger continuities of
political organization than has been the case in Africa. Asia has had a num-
ber of long-standing state entities, often largely inwardly-focused and with
sizeable internal markets allowing significant degrees of economic differen-
tiation and integration. Culturally, broad civilizational continuities in some of
the major countries helped to sustain basic political and administrative cohe-
sion and facilitate social mobilisation on virtually a mega scale (Kumar
1997). None of this was to preclude major violence and political upheavals
at critical historical intervals, but surely there was a strong focus on conti-
nuity and preservation of the state systems. Colonial rule, severely impact-
ing though it did, largely took the form of ‘trickle-down’ and (selective)
absorption of Western elements, while by and large seeking to incorporate
distinct pre-colonial polities into larger viable frameworks.
This stood in striking contrast to the African situation, characterized by
fragmentation of the continent into arbitrary entities and the imposition of
a wholly new and alien order. The resulting ‘gap’ in state-society relations
in the African context has never really been closed since, and has been per-
petuated through the lack of a political class which does not have its roots
within one of the characteristic states’ ethno-regional groups. Economic
dynamics have not been able to counter these tendencies, but have, on the
contrary, for a long time reinforced the presence and continuity of essen-
tially vulnerable bureaucratic ruling classes. As contrasted to recurrent
formative economic, political and cultural processes in several of the larger
states of Asia, therefore, Africa’s state systems appear to have been
6bequeathed with a stronger baseline vulnerability and propensity for col-
lapse. Africa’s state formative processes in this regard have also been rad-
ically different from their European predecessors, in which more cohesive
state-society linkages and stronger states were forged through taxation of
the citizenry necessary in order to pay the armies that needed to be
employed to fight off rival powers (Tilly 1992). In similar vein Mick Moore
has further pointed to the vulnerability and weakness of governance struc-
tures of many countries in the South through scrutiny of their revenue basis
(Moore 2004).
Latin America figures less distinctively in this equation. While most Latin
American countries have been notably ‘statist’, in some like Argentine and
Chili strong state systems were ruling over largely immigrant populations,
whereas in others such as in most of the Andes countries states and urban
classes alike have tended to confront an amalgam of indigenous rural com-
munities. Neither of the two kinds of systems so far have been particularly
known for their propensity to collapse, though the challenges to the state
from different kinds of powerful popular movements in Colombia, Bolivia,
Peru and Mexico have recently been clearly on the rise.
Effects of the Cold War
For a prolonged period of time, though, these state-society gaps and the
potential fragility that comes with them were largely masked as an indirect
effect of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the super-powers supported
any client state they could win to their side whether democratic or not, giv-
ing it the means to suppress dissidents and other unwanted elements so as
to keep the regime concerned in power (not unlike what has been happen-
ing more recently again in a number of cases in the ‘war against terrorism’).
Appearances of ‘unity’, integrity and ‘sovereignty’ were thus being kept up.
Also, a basic ‘nation state’ model was not questioned. Independence had
meant ‘nation-building’, i.e. the idea of trying to create national states out of
an amalgam of ethnic, linguistic and other groups – which often had had lit-
tle to do with one another or in some cases had had long histories of mutu-
al rivalry and conflict. Quite a number of scholars adopted this perspective
as well, and in fact there were few alternatives available. The ‘nationalist’
movement in many African cases had actually not run very deeply. 
During the first decade or two of independence, African and other post-
colonial states thus figured as the privileged partner of many aid agencies,
the World Bank, and other donors, - so much so that  critical voices on the
left had begun to express concern about ’overdeveloped’ state systems and
their lack of performance and responsiveness to societal demands.  For
many years, in any case, in the implied policy debate on giving priority to
78
strengthening governmental capabilities versus responding to popular
demands, the collective weight of the external variable had been biased
squarely towards heightening the interventionist powers of the state.
External demands and inroads
After the Cold War, as inadequacies in ‘governance’ became increasingly
apparent in various cases, like in several African countries or in Bangla-
desh, the World Bank and IMF, followed by the wider donor circuit, initi-
ated a whole series of interventions to promote ‘good governance’: struc-
tural adjustment, economic liberalization and privatization were partly
aimed at pushing back the predominance and power of state structures
and were introduced in the expectation that ‘civil society’ would take over
and play its game like in 19
th/20
th century Europe. This also marked the
beginning of global thinking in terms of ‘state failure’: from that point
onwards ‘the state’ (which until little earlier had been seen as the prime
mover of everything that needed doing) began to be blamed for innumer-
able kinds of failures as diagnosed from the global development centres.
As the notion of ‘good governance’ is highly amorphous while potentially
referring to a wide range of qualities and indicators, state systems could
be found faulty on the basis of shifting sets of criteria (Doornbos 2003).
Global policies at the same time began to sideline the sovereign nation-
state model, making room for new departures conveying externally
designed models for statehood in the South.
In the course of the 1980s, from policy statements as well as actions, it
became clear that the global organisations and the donor community began
to embrace wholesale the critique of the ‘overdeveloped state’ which had
earlier been espoused by radical scholars (often then to the irritation of those
same organisations).The international community as led by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund began to show signs of a major rever-
sal in its appreciation of the role of the African state in particular and seemed
to opt for what might, at first sight, appear an almost anarchistic route.
Earlier the exclusive recipient, partner and rationale of international aid and
attention, the African state’s ‘most favoured’ status increasingly appeared to
get eclipsed in the eyes of donor organizations by a veil of assumed obso-
lescence. Aside from the chains of the debt burden, the autonomy of the
African state was increasingly being bypassed and eroded by the interna-
tional donor community in a whole range of critical ways such as: 
(1) advocacy of privatisation and of increasing involvement of private
enterprise in aid arrangements; 
(2) significant diversion of aid funds via non-governmental organisa-
tions and channels; 9
(3) the formation of donor co-ordinating consortia, with corresponding
national counterpart ‘front’ organisations, which began to assume
major policy roles in, for example, the planning and disbursement
of food aid; 
(4) the rapidly growing donor specialisation and involvement in selec-
ted sectors and/or regions within African countries, facilitating a 
gradual shift of policy-preparation activities to donor headquarters,
away from national co-ordinating ministries or organisations for 
the sector concerned; 
(5) donor preferences to work with autonomous ‘non-bureaucratic’ 
corporate statutory bodies, believed to combine the advantages of 
public jurisdiction and private discretionary powers and considered
attractive as external agencies could establish close working rela-
tionships with them, thereby gaining direct influence 
(6) detailed specification of external parameters and prescriptions in 
national budgetary and policy processes; and 
(7) the introduction of highly advanced and sophisticated monitoring 
and evaluation methodologies, for which there was often insuffi-
cient national expertise available to constitute an effective coun-
terpart in the policy discussion and implementation concerned
(Mkandawire 2004,  Morss 1984:465-470; Smith and Wood
1984:405-434; Wuyts 1989). 
Also, in decentralisation policies, privatisation and non-government initia-
tives were increasingly being encouraged, occasionally leaving questions as
to which bodies would theoretically still be responsible for guarding the
‘common interest’ (Meynen and Doornbos 2004). Most of these departures
have been guiding global and donor policies until in fact today.
No doubt many of the policy initiatives concerned were motivated by
earnest desires to raise the effectiveness of aid programmes, to make use
of insights gained through experience, including earlier mistakes and gener-
ally to improve performance and outputs. Still, the combined impact, mag-
nitude and complexity of all these incremental contributions by the collec-
tive international community began to constitute an overwhelming weight
on the policy-making processes of individual African countries, for the total-
ity of which nobody would take responsibility. Given the limited financial
and staffing resources vis-à-vis this collective external expertise, the role of
the national government often became necessarily limited to accepting - or
possibly refusing to accept - ready-made policy packages prepared else-
where or already agreed upon by the main donors. 
Out of impatience with the poor formulation and implementation of plans
by African states, various donor organisations and governments sought
engagement in ‘policy dialogue’ - a process which is based less on equalstatus of discussion partners than the name might suggest. However, the
question is whether a critique on state performance justified the far-reach-
ing interventions, verging on custodianship, which have been made into the
policy determination of African states (Ravenhill 1988:179-210). One might
wonder whether a point would not be reached where the state as the nerve
centre for national policy-making could risk collapse under the collective
weight of the international community’s involvement and interventions,
well-intentioned or otherwise. ‘Policy dialogue’, the international donor
euphemism, paralleled the weakening capacity to keep control over one’s
own affairs in many cases.
At this point, it might be useful to further reflect for a moment on some of
the implications of all the successive judgments passed in particular on
African states in terms of ‘state failure’, usually accompanied by new
rounds of admonitions as to how they should ‘restructure’ or go about their
‘good governance’. The realities concerned, in Africa, but not only there,
have indeed been sobering. But again, what exactly are notions like ‘failing
states’ supposed to denote in donor parlance? What and whose criteria are
at stake and how consistent are these criteria themselves? If ‘failing states’
and ‘good governance’ conceptually seem to relate to one another as chick-
en and egg, then was it ‘failing states’ which evoked new notions of ‘good
governance’, or vice versa? More specifically, what role models for proper
state performance have been implied by interventions such as the Structural
Adjustment packages, aiming to make state agencies leaner and theoreti-
cally more effective, or by today’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers,
meant to produce increasingly detailed entries by which state policies are
to be externally monitored? 
The World Bank initiated ‘good governance’ agenda itself provides a good
example, first, of how selected western-derived standards of governance
were held up as a model to the South as to how they should go about their
state restructuring, and second, how the use of this ‘model’ has nonethe-
less since been rapidly shifting. Initially serving as a set of criteria against
which political conditionalities could be demanded (meaning: we will not
give further loans or aid unless you follow our prescriptions for state
restructuring), it was subsequently reformulated as a selection criteria for
aid-deserving countries (meaning: you will first have to have ‘good gover-
nance’, or at least show you are moving in that direction, before we will
consider your requests for aid). Evidently, the latter in principle left all those
countries that fail in this respect or that cannot muster the energy to try
and fit the criteria, to their own devices. 
For all the concern with ‘good governance’ there has hardly been a donor
saying: let us know whether you would like us to assist you in building up
your state institutions your way and we will see what we can do, no con-
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ditionalities attached. Such a posture might have begun to enable ‘demand-
ing’ or ‘requesting’ countries to regain some sense of overall command and
genuine ownership over their policy formulation and policy integration. It is
this most vital aspect of any governance structure and process which has
become seriously eroded due to the massive donor involvement in policy
determination in many countries. Donors by and large have wanted to be in
command, rather than be available on demand. 
One question which thus arises is whether these interventions made ‘fail-
ing states’ more robust and better equipped to face up to the vagaries of
today’s global environment, or whether they may actually have deepened
their fragility and failure. Notions of ‘failure’ of one kind or another appear
to have laid at the basis of various successive interventions initiated in
recent decades by World Bank, IMF and other global institutions -  the ‘good
governance’ agenda, SA and PRSPs in particular - , each time arguing that
state failure of one kind or another called for new interventions and reform.
It is difficult to avoid the impression however that each time the recipes
concerned, rather than leading to any noticeable amelioration, were put
aside after a while to make room for new rounds of diagnosis and direc-
tives. The state systems concerned appear to have been pushed into
greater dependency on external (financial) support on the one hand, and
with a weakening position vis-à-vis their own societies on the other. Some
further in depth analysis of these successive waves of interaction between
the identification of ‘failing’ state performance and global interventions,
each time based on novel criteria and insights, would constitute a timely
research project.
Different trajectories
While many state systems in Africa and other parts of the South have been
seriously weakened as a result of external inroads, in a few cases they have
moved from state ‘failure’ in one respect or another to full scale collapse.
Such situations, in which all state functions come to grind down and result
in potential or actual blank spaces emerging on the world’s maps, have
been basically unprecedented in modern history. Yet, we should not
assume that there is a single ‘recipe’ for collapse, or a single path or set of
determinants, calling in turn for a single set of responses. Short of, or
beyond, the broader post-Cold War policy reversals leading to a substan-
tially changing global context for viable statehood and prompting an
increased incidence of state fragility and collapse, different political and
economic constellations appear to have given rise to different trajectories
to collapse. We should thus avoid a priori assumptions about the causes of
state collapse except in terms of their pre-conditions.The lifting of Cold War hegemonic ‘support’ structures should be primarily
understood as implying that different social and political state systems -
some of them more robust, others more fragile and vulnerable, yet each
embedded within its own historically endowed socio-political and cultural
context - were laid open to a whole range of political and economic forces
and interests, internal and external. Such major reversals of global (pre-)con-
ditions should therefore not be expected to promote or induce broadly par-
allel tracks. The particular patterns that might ensue would depend on such
factors as the structuring of political forces, societal divisions, resource
endowments and so on. In facing the forces of post-Cold War globalisation,
state systems with different fault lines in their social or economic structures
could thus exhibit notably contrasted patterns of fragmentation. 
Appreciating such different contexts and trajectories is important also with
an eye on assessing the appropriateness of external responses, or for under-
standing new conflicts arising out of conflicting scenarios for political
rebuilding (Doornbos 2002). For instance, if the key problem in a given sit-
uation were identified as one of grossly malfunctioning institutions (as is
often assumed), then presumably there would be a case for major internal
institutional repair or overhaul - even though this might leave unattended
the root causes of arbitrary rule, ethnic grievances or other conflicts that
may have been responsible for the failing institutions in the first place. But
if collapse has occurred or is threatening due to a state system’s extreme
vulnerability to changing externally driven economic conditions, then obvi-
ously the focus for remedial action should be shifted into different direc-
tions. Again, if a basic mismatch between a country’s state framework and
societal structure lies at the root of collapse, then it may well be more pru-
dent to allow fresh departures to emerge out of that situation than insisting
on re-instatement of the previous failing state structures or the maintenance
of ex-colonial boundaries. In other words, the routes for remedial or pre-
ventive action may need to be just as different as the tracks leading to col-
lapse. Mistakes in identifying the patterns of causality, and thus appropri-
ate responses, may worsen already precarious situations. 
Unsurprisingly, in recent years several instances of collapse have been fol-
lowed by international calls for restoration of ‘order’, sanctions, or even
advocacy of some form of international trusteeship for certain situations. To
be sure, it is conceivable that some contexts may require a basic restora-
tion of order and security to start with and might call for external actors
playing a key role in that. In some situations of state fragmentation or col-
lapse, especially if marked by profound stalemate between rival parties,
there may simply be no alternative to some form of third party engagement,
at the negotiating table or otherwise.
12However, external actors should beware of rapid and overwhelming inter-
ventions which in turn would create new internal-external dichotomies.
Internal actors as a matter of course must be allowed - and should them-
selves claim - a central role in any efforts at political reconstruction. Also,
following state collapse, agonising re-appraisal of the nature of the (col-
lapsed) state system in broadly representative fashion may need to run its
course, and should be allowed the time it needs. As suggested above, if the
key problem has been a lack of fit between political forces and societal struc-
tures then any straight-jacketing back into the previous state forms that
failed should be avoided. In any such cases, a situation of statelessness last-
ing for some time should not by definition be viewed as problematic, but
might allow much-needed re-appraisal of alternative structures, and futures. 
Recognising different trajectories and their respective (potential) outcomes
thus appears to be of the utmost importance when considering what
responses, international or otherwise, would be most appropriate in a given
situation. That message, however, does not always seem to be heeded. A
recipe-thirsty international community rather appears inclined to search for
readily available programmes of intervention, at times apparently irrespec-
tive of the factors that have led to actual crisis situations. 
It is not difficult to understand how such inclinations may come about.
While the international community considers it has a role to play in the
redress of severe crisis with respect to particular countries, the time, inter-
est and expertise to investigate how particular routes have actually led to
collapse is often lacking. In the light of the perceived challenges of failing
states and instances of state collapse, many multilateral and bilateral aid
agencies have in recent years set up their own programs meant to respond
to the complex political emergencies to which these may give rise. A com-
mon strategy is to try to be prepared for rapid and effective action.
Significantly, these tendencies have acquired a dynamic of their own, and
in their pursuit of effectiveness and co-ordinated action may paradoxically
lead away from, rather than towards, developing capacities to design con-
text-specific approaches. Moreover, external agendas and an interest in
capturing the moment and bringing about fundamental change may enter
the equation, irrespective of the dynamics that may have led to a given sit-
uation. As was noted in a GTZ report:
‘[post]-conflict situations often provide special opportunities for
political, legal, economic and administrative reforms to change 
past systems and structures which may have contributed to eco-
nomic and social inequities and conflict…In the wake of conflict, 
donors should seize opportunities to help promote and maintain
the momentum for reconciliation and needed reforms’. (Mehler and
Ribaux in Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical 
Co-operation, 2000: 37) 
13On the donor front, several features deserve attention. One has been the
tendency to search for common strategies, in part as a corrective to situa-
tions in which different external agencies were all doing their own thing,
resulting in proverbial inter-agency confusion (Moore 1996). Through co-
ordinated interventions, it is anticipated that effectiveness, strength, and
impact can be optimised. Second and closely related there has been a ten-
dency to work towards set recipes, which can be deployed at once and in
all situations, again in response to perceived urgencies and demands of
effectiveness (ibid.). Third, some authors and agencies are less inhibited
about suggesting the need to sideline the ‘sovereignty’ of some of the
affected countries, proposing to have it temporarily replaced through a UN
or some other ‘mandate’ (for instance, Helman and Ratner 1992, Pfaff
1995). Fourth, there has been a trend among leading multilateral agencies
to see post-conflict contexts as a suitable ground, and moment, to install
market-friendly frameworks, thus seeing fresh starts as the moment for
fresh designs of a particular kind. Thus, a Carnegie/UNHCR document
authored by John Stremlau, after noting that it ‘foresees the need for fun-
damental changes in the definition and defence of [the] principles of sover-
eign equality’, went on to suggest that ‘sustainable development based on
legitimate combinations of market economics, democratic values and a
healthy civil society can eventually provide the means for any nation to
resolve internal conflicts peacefully and fairly’ (Stremlau 1998: 2). A guid-
ing hand was also offered by a new State Department Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), tasked “to lead
and coordinate U.S. Government planning, and institutionalize U.S. capaci-
ty, to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or
civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path towards peace, democracy
and a market economy.” (West 2005: 30). Similar policy projections have
increasingly been articulated in other official and semi-official statements.
The trouble with many of such statements of intention to engage in exter-
nal societal engineering, however, is that they give little indication as to
what space they intend to grant to domestic actors.
Imagining Fresh Starts
So what could be done to reverse tendencies that block fresh openings and
political re-starts, and allow constructive interactions on policy priorities in
rehabilitation? First and foremost, there is a need to de-generalise, that is,
for external actors and analysts to resist the temptation to overly generalise
about causes of state collapse and their solutions. Instead, due attention
should be given in analyses as well as in policy outlines to the implications
of contrasted contexts, different dynamics and different trajectories that
may continue to play crucial roles when trying to move from collapse to
recovery. Responses should be context- and trajectory-sensitive, and must
14not start out from a priori positions. Donor agencies should, in this light,
refrain from investing too much time and energy in the generation of gen-
eralised policy responses and blueprints. Instead, they should consider col-
lapse and re-start situations in more specific terms, beginning with a sound
understanding of the trajectories that gave rise to them, and with an adap-
tive position as to what these might require in terms of redress or rehabili-
tation. Such a more receptive posture might also instil more modest ambi-
tions among external actors with respect to the scope and capacity they
have to influence processes of political reconstruction. With less program-
matic orientations determining agency responses and actions, there might
be greater chance of external actors concentrating on how they could best
respond to demands arising from specific situations, developing a reactive
rather than a pro-active stance.
Fresh start moments, almost by definition, are delicate. They may be full of
promise and expectations of brighter futures, taking distance from the past.
At the same time, they are extremely fragile, as the conflicts and violence
that were inherent in the processes of breakdown and collapse will still be
alive at least in the memory, and could conceivably be re-ignited. Fresh
starts therefore need careful handling by all, and sound understandings of
the circumstances that gave rise to them. External actors can have impor-
tant roles to play at such moments, especially in advisory and moderating
capacities geared towards consensus and confidence building among pre-
viously hostile parties. But they should be aware of the risks of complicat-
ing the process if they expect their designs for new political futures and
structures to play a primary role.
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